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The Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.1 
provided an incomplete and unsatisfying response to the issue 
that has provoked far more antitrust scholarship than any 
other in the past decade—patent settlements between branded 
and generic drug companies where the branded makes a 
“reverse payment” to the generic to stay off the market for 
some period of time before the expiration of the branded’s 
patent.2 In brief, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion rejected the 
Eleventh Circuit’s standard under which settlements within 
the patent’s exclusionary potential were presumed lawful.3 It 
also rejected more draconian rules, like the per se illegal rule 
adopted by the Sixth Circuit4 and the quick look approach 
urged by the FTC.5 It opted instead for a rule of reason 
analysis, where the defendant is free to show that the reverse 
payment is a “rough approximation of the litigation expenses 
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 1. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 2. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of 118 Law, Economics, and Business 
Professors and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Petitioners at 
11–12, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2233 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 
391001. 
 3. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38. In addition to the Circuit Court opinion 
in FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. 
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), the Eleventh Circuit had followed 
this rule in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 
2005), and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th 
Cir. 2003). 
 4. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907–09 (6th Cir. 
2003) (“There is simply no escaping the conclusion that the [reverse payment] 
Agreement . . . was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate 
competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United 
States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”). 
 5. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
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saved through the settlement,” that the “payment may reflect 
compensation for other services that the generic has promised 
to perform,” or that the settlement was motivated by other 
competitively benign considerations.6 
The Actavis decision punted more than it decided. 
Although narrowing the range of possible outcomes by rejecting 
the legal rules at the extremes and opting for a rule of reason 
middle ground, the opinion failed to grapple with the most 
challenging issues of regulatory policy raised by 
pharmaceutical patent settlements. In particular, it failed to 
clearly delineate the social costs of permitting and disallowing 
patent settlements, avoided grappling with the crucial issues of 
patent validity and infringement, and erroneously focused on 
“reverse payments” as a distinctive antitrust problem when 
equally or more anticompetitive settlements can be crafted 
without reverse payments. 
Although Actavis is a frustrating opinion, it is perhaps too 
much to expect judges to solve the patent settlements 
challenge. As we enter the post-Actavis phase of antitrust 
litigation over branded-generic settlements, it will become 
increasingly clear that a comprehensive regulatory solution is 
needed. 
I. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PATENT SETTLEMENTS 
For all of the complexity around the patent settlements 
issue, a foundational observation regarding the social costs of 
patent settlements is quite clear—making it all the more 
frustrating that it is so frequently ignored. When a pioneer 
drug company sues a generic entrant for patent infringement, 
there is some probability, x, that the pioneer company will win 
and obtain an injunction keeping the generic product off the 
market until the expiration of the patent.7 (We can slightly 
complicate the analysis by adding that a successful suit by the 
pioneer may set a precedent that discourages other generics 
from the market too).8 1 – x renders the remaining probability, 
y, the chance that the pioneer company will lose the lawsuit 
                                                          
 6. Id. at 2236. 
 7. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 
J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 91 (2005). 
 8. Cf. id. (assuming for purposes of the article’s analysis that no other 
potential generic entrants exist). 
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and that the generic product will enter before the patent 
expires.9 If the generic product is forced to stay off the market 
until the patent expires, the pioneer will be able to charge a 
supracompetitive price, yielding a social loss of p, which 
consists of just deadweight losses or deadweight losses plus 
wealth transfers, depending on one’s denominational 
persuasion.10 The social cost of patent settlements involving 
delayed generic entry is yp, or the probability that (but for the 
settlement) the generic would have entered times the monopoly 
overcharge costs to society.11 
The immediate implication of this bivariate social cost 
formula is that one cannot assess the social costs of patent 
settlements without some understanding of the probability of 
generic entry absent the settlement. The Actavis majority 
dismissed the need to understand the strength of the patent 
invalidity or non-infringement defenses of the generic,12 relying 
instead on evidence of what the economics of the settlement 
might reveal about the branded firm’s intent.13 But, unlike the 
probability of generic entry, the branded firm’s intent with 
respect to the settlement is not a direct input into the social 
cost equation. Indeed, it would only be relevant at all if it 
revealed the pioneer’s implicit understanding of y. To be sure, 
the economics of the settlement may reveal something about 
the pioneer’s implicit understanding of y, but probably less 
than the majority believed and certainly less than a direct 
assessment of y. 
In focusing on the subjective motivation for the settlement, 
the Actavis majority appeared to suggest that any motivation 
by the pioneer to eliminate y is inherently anticompetitive and 
damning—what Learned Hand referred to in Alcoa as “caput 
                                                          
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. at 83 (“[W]hen patents are improperly issued for rights that 
are not novel, or are ‘obvious,’ the public suffers without justification by 
paying supracompetitive prices.”). 
 11. Cf. Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent 
Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. 
REV. 747, 754–55 (2002). 
 12. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (“[I]t is normally not 
necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question . . . .”). 
 13. Id. at 2237 (“Although the parties may have reasons to prefer 
settlements that include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust question is: 
What are those reasons?”). 
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lupinum” (the head of a wolf).14 This is an odd assumption and 
one at odds with the ordinary operation of the rule of reason. 
The motivation to suppress competition is often a small piece of 
many business arrangements that easily satisfy the rule of 
reason.15 
Take, for example, the classic rule of reason case—Mitchel 
v. Reynolds—which involved a bakehouse lease with a covenant 
not to compete in the same parish for five years.16 It is certainly 
conceivable that, absent the lease, the lessor and lessee would 
have entered into competition within the relevant geographic 
market. Each may have had some incentive to agree to the 
lease in order to eliminate that possibility. But any elimination 
of y in that case was swamped by the procompetitive effects of 
the deal—that the lessee was apparently in a better position to 
exploit the bakehouse assets than the lessor. These efficiencies 
could not have been realized if the lessor had been able to re-
capture some of the bakery’s goodwill by opening a nearby 
competitive facility. 
Oddly, Actavis seemed to suggest that any residual trace of 
insurance against y in a complex settlement agreement renders 
the settlement anticompetitive as a whole. This approach 
ignores that yp may be considerably smaller than the 
procompetitive benefits of a settlement. As is well documented 
in the literature, these include not only the elimination of 
direct litigation costs, as the majority assumed,17 but many 
others. Indirect litigation costs often exceed attorney’s and 
expert witness fees.18 The early elimination of uncertainty 
around generic entry can allow for better planning by both 
pioneers and generics, and invention around the patent.19 The 
settlement option increases the generic’s flexibility in 
challenging the pioneer’s patent and hence decreases the costs 
                                                          
 14. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 
1945) (“[F]or not all that even a monopolist may earn is caput lupinum.”). 
 15. See Crane, supra note 11, at 778 (“A patentee’s intentions are 
virtually always explicitly ‘anticompetitive’ in the precise sense in which 
antitrust lawyers mean those words—the patentee wishes to suppress the 
competition for its patented good in order to preserve a stream of monopoly 
rents from that good.”). 
 16. Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (B.R.) 347; 1 P. Wms. 
181, 181. 
 17. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 18. See Crane, supra note 11, at 757–58. 
 19. Id. at 762–63. 
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of generic challenges.20 Many settlements allow for entry years 
before the expiration of the patent, a possibility that would be 
eliminated by the pioneer’s victory in the patent litigation.21 In 
ordinary rule of reason analysis, one would analyze and weigh 
these factors against yp, something the Actavis majority 
seemed reluctant to permit. 
II. CONCENTRATING ON THE DIRECTION OF PAYMENT 
Like some courts and commentators before, the Actavis 
majority saw something unnatural and inherently suspect in 
reverse payments, observing that the reverse payment “form of 
settlement is unusual.”22 But, as has been observed on many 
occasions, the reverse payment form is a byproduct of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s regulatory framework.23 Because of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s automatic thirty-month stay of the 
generic’s right to enter the market and the branded firm’s 
obligation to file a patent challenge within forty-five days of a 
generic company’s ANDA filing,24 the patent litigation usually 
unfolds in a time period when the generic product will not yet 
be on the market.25 Indeed, even if the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
                                                          
 20. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 
188, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing expert declaration of Dr. Jerry Hausman for 
the proposition that “[t]o maximize these incentives [for generics to challenge 
branded patents], a generic company should be permitted to choose not only 
when to commence patent litigation, but also when to terminate it” (citation 
omitted)). 
 21. See Michael A. Carrier, Provigil: A Case Study of Anticompetitive 
Behavior, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 441, 442–44 (2011) (discussing early 
entry provisions in agreements between pioneer and generic companies 
regarding the medication Provigil, wherein the generic companies agreed in 
2006 to delay market entry until 2012, when the patents were set to expire in 
2015). 
 22. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013); see also id. at 2233 
(“In the traditional examples cited above, a party with a claim (or 
counterclaim) for damages receives a sum equal to or less than the value of its 
claim. In reverse payment settlements, in contrast, a party with no claim for 
damages (something that is usually true of a paragraph IV litigation 
defendant) walks away with money simply so it will stay away from the 
patentee’s market.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A 
Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 51 (2009) 
(describing the increasing use of reverse payment settlements under the Act). 
 24. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012). 
 25. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements As Patent Invalidity Signals, 
24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 293–94 (2011) (“[U]nlike usual patent litigation 
where the dispute touches on products that are already on or about to enter 
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automatic stay has lifted because of the expiration of the thirty 
months or the denial of a preliminary injunction, the generic 
may be reluctant to enter the market because of the asymmetry 
between the damages the pioneer can collect in the event of 
victory and the profits the generic can earn by marketing over 
the same period. All of this means that, at the time most 
pioneer-generic settlements occur, the branded has not yet 
been injured by generic entry. It has no damages to demand 
from the generic and any settlement payment in consideration 
of the cessation of litigation must thus proceed from the 
plaintiff to the defendant.26 
The direction of payment in a patent settlement is only 
roughly correlated with yp. It certainly is not a direct input, 
which makes the concentration on the direction of payment a 
sideshow to the important economic questions that should be 
addressed. What’s worse, by focusing on reverse payments as a 
distinctive issue requiring antitrust scrutiny, the Court ignored 
the fact that equally or more anticompetitive patent 
settlements can be constructed with no reverse payment at all, 
as discussed next. 
III. EASY ANTICOMPETITIVE WORK-AROUNDS 
One of the factors that Justice Breyer identified as 
supporting the legality of a reverse payment is evidence that 
the “payment may reflect compensation for other services that 
the generic has promised to perform—such as distributing the 
patented item or helping to develop a market for that item.”27 
He apparently has in mind a circumstance, true in some of the 
patent settlement cases, where the generic agrees to distribute 
either the branded drug or an authorized generic and receives a 
promise of payment for its services as part of the settlement. 
Indeed, if a generic and pioneer want to avoid the stigma of the 
reverse payment altogether, it is simple to “naturalize” the 
direction of payment by having the generic promise to pay the 
                                                          
the market, Hatch-Waxman litigation occurs prior to the generic drug actually 
entering the market. Consequently, in the Hatch-Waxman litigation there are 
no damages (other than the cost of litigation for each party) to be had. Yet 
under a reverse settlement the patentee often pays amounts far exceeding the 
cost of litigation to the challengers.”). 
 26. See id.; see also supra note 22. 
 27. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
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patentee for the right to be a distributor.28 Instead of an agency 
model where the generic collects on behalf of the brand and 
receives compensation for its efforts, the model can be reverted 
to a licensing model where the generic is authorized to 
distribute the drug, remitting some share of the proceeds to the 
pioneer as a royalty.29 In that case, we have both the absence of 
a reverse payment and the fact of early generic entry, which 
should easily satisfy the Actavis rule of reason standard. 
However, such agreements may be worse from a 
competition standpoint than the reverse payments at issue in 
Actavis.30 Suppose, for example, that prior to generic entry, the 
monopoly mark-up per unit is equal to one dollar. Now suppose 
that the pioneer brings a patent infringement lawsuit with a 
low probability of success. Prior to adjudication of that lawsuit, 
the pioneer settles with the generic, making the generic its 
authorized generic distributor. The generic agrees to remit to 
the pioneer a royalty of one dollar per unit sale. Unless the 
generic’s marginal costs of production or distribution are lower 
than that of the pioneer, we now have (1) early generic entry; 
(2) no reverse payment; and (3) a continuation of precisely the 
previous monopoly pricing. 
Indeed, if the licensing agreement continues until the 
expiration of the patent, this scenario may be worse than some 
reverse payment settlements, particularly those that permit 
generic entry before the expiration of the patent. Further, we 
need not make the royalty equal to the full monopoly 
overcharge in order to produce anticompetitive results. Say the 
royalty is equal to 90% of the monopoly overcharge. Now, in 
addition to early generic entry and no reverse payment, we 
have the delightful bonus of immediate price reductions. But 
there is still potentially an enormous anticompetitive effect. 
Since the first generic to market ordinarily sets its price 
around 70%–80% of the brand,31 this settlement deprives 
                                                          
 28. See Crane, supra note 11, at 765. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. at 765–66. 
 31. See Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition 
in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS, 1991, at 1, 35 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford 
Winston eds., 1991) (“[G]eneric drugs sell for a substantial discount from the 
price of the branded drug; the estimates suggest that with a single generic 
entrant, the generic price is roughly 60 percent of the branded drug price.”); 
David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV. 
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consumers of a much larger price decrease they might have 
received in the but-for world. 
This example is not fanciful. The FDA currently lists 673 
authorized generics on the market.32 To the extent that these 
agreements do not involve reverse payments, they will not 
show up on the post-Actavis radar screen. But every antitrust 
lawyer worth his or her salt will be pushing clients in the 
direction of settlements of this nature that avoid reverse 
payments. Circumvention of the reverse payment rule 
established in Actavis is relatively easy. 
To repeat an earlier point, what drives yp is not the 
direction in which payment flows in a patent settlement. It is 
the probability that but for the settlement, the generic and 
pioneer would have entered into price competition. There are 
ample means other than reverse payments to soften 
competition between branded and generic drug firms. Actavis 
does not merely ignore this possibility. By crediting licensing 
agreements as a robustly procompetitive defense, it compounds 
the error of the decision and appears to grant categorical 
immunity to other forms of anticompetitive agreement. 
IV. THE CONTINUING NEED FOR REGULATORY 
SOLUTIONS 
Actavis represents another instance of what my colleague 
Becky Eisenberg has called “patent punting” strategies—
refusals by courts to engage with the strength of patents in 
cases other than patent infringement cases. It is 
understandable that judges prefer to treat patents as black 
boxes rather than to engage their merits. After all, patent is 
such a specialized and technical area of law that it is the one of 
the very few for which we have created a specialized court of 
appeals. Relitigating in the antitrust case the full merits of the 
                                                          
ECON. & STAT. 37, 44 (2005) (explaining that their study showed a single 
generic entrant would set its price at 88% of the branded price); see also Caves 
et al., supra, at 44–45 (finding that generic producers depress the branded 
drug’s price and “enter the market quoting prices much lower than those of 
their branded competitors”). 
 32. FDA Listing of Authorized Generics as of July 22, 2013, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/
OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/UCM183605.pdf (last visited Aug. 
28, 2013). 
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previously settled patent infringement litigation is a burden 
that neither the parties nor the courts wish to undertake. 
But the fact that the undertaking is burdensome is not a 
good reason to eschew it if it provides one of the two necessary 
inputs to understanding whether the settlement is harmful to 
consumer welfare.33 Unless we can determine y just by 
deconstructing the settlement economics—something far more 
difficult than the Actavis court seemed to assume—there is no 
substitute for direct engagement with the strength of the 
patent infringement claim, meaning both the patent validity 
and the defendant’s non-infringement defense. 
To say that there needs to be direct engagement with the 
strength of the patent infringement claim is not to say that 
courts need to do this. The analytical and practical gaps in 
Actavis point to the need for a greater degree of regulatory 
involvement in branded-generic contestation over patent 
rights. One could imagine a range of regulatory actors that 
already touch aspects of these problems—the PTO, FDA, or 
FTC, for example—playing a greater role in opening the black 
box of the patent infringement claim and hence providing 
information more directly relevant to the antitrust analysis 
than the direction of the settlement payment. 
Actavis showed the courts grappling for solutions they are 
ill-equipped to provide. As the next wave of antitrust litigation 
around patent settlements unfolds in coming years and the 
vulnerability of courts in answering the relevant questions 
becomes more apparent, the need for regulatory solutions will 
become clearer. The door should now be opened for creative 
proposals for regulatory solutions. 
 
                                                          
 33. Indeed, one might say that y is the crucial input, since it can 
reasonably be assumed that p will be large given economic evidence on the 
price reduction patterns upon generic entry. See Caves et al., supra note 31, at 
44–45. 
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